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Abstract
Background: Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses have had devastating effects on poultry industries
worldwide, and there is concern about the potential for HPAI outbreaks in the poultry industry in Great Britain
(GB). Critical to the potential for HPAI to spread between poultry premises are the connections made between
farms by movements related to human activity. Movement records of catching teams and slaughterhouse vehicles
were obtained from a large catching company, and these data were used in a simulation model of HPAI spread
between farms serviced by the catching company, and surrounding (geographic) areas. The spread of HPAI
through real-time movements was modelled, with the addition of spread via company personnel and local
transmission.
Results: The model predicted that although large outbreaks are rare, they may occur, with long distances between
infected premises. Final outbreak size was most sensitive to the probability of spread via slaughterhouse-linked
movements whereas the probability of onward spread beyond an index premises was most sensitive to the
frequency of company personnel movements.
Conclusions: Results obtained from this study show that, whilst there is the possibility that HPAI virus will jump
from one cluster of farms to another, movements made by catching teams connected fewer poultry premises in
an outbreak situation than slaughterhouses and company personnel. The potential connection of a large number
of infected farms, however, highlights the importance of retaining up-to-date data on poultry premises so that
control measures can be effectively prioritised in an outbreak situation.
Background
For a wide range of epidemic infections, contact struc-
tures can be used to describe the potential transmission
of infection in a population [1-4]. The validity of such
models, however, depends on the parameterisation of
the contact structures analysed. The existence of the
animal movement licensing scheme and cattle tracing
system in Great Britain (GB), for which the identifica-
tion and movements of cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, deer
and horses, must be recorded [5], allows for the recon-
struction and analysis of the network of contacts in
order to predict the spread of infectious disease across
these industries. This is not the case for the poultry
industry where, before 2005, there was no national reg-
ister of poultry farms. Motivated by numerous outbreaks
of H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI)
across the world and the occurrence of several incur-
sions of avian influenza viruses (AIV) in GB [6,7], infor-
mation was collected by the British government on
poultry farm locations, and on the frequency and types
of movements between farms.
In GB, the poultry industry can be divided into the
primary breeding sector and the production sector. The
biosecurity levels in the primary breeding sector are
considered to be consistently high, making the probabil-
ity of introduction of pathogens into this sector extre-
mely low. In the production sector, birds are purchased
from a primary breeding company when they are one
day old. Birds then remain on specialist rearing farms
until approximately eighteen weeks of age before they
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meat birds enter the food chain, a catching company
may be brought in to assist in the catching of birds to
be sent to slaughter. Some catching companies may
operate on multiple independently owned farms, and
some farms may not use a catching company at all,
choosing to send birds directly to the slaughterhouse.
Vehicles used to transport birds between farms and
slaughterhouses are often owned by the slaughterhouse
and therefore may act as a link between different pro-
duction farms. Partly due to the increase in the number
and types of movements made on to and off production
farms and partly due to increased exposure of birds to
the environment in the production sector, it is here
where diseases such as AIV have the opportunity to
enter a farm, rendering the production sector the focus
of this study.
It has already been shown that AIVs have the poten-
tial to be spread to a large number of poultry premises
via movement of humans and fomites [8,9]. Company
personnel, feed lorries, egg collectors, slaughterhouse
and catching company personnel (and equipment) have
been identified as contact mechanisms between farms,
over which disease may transmit [10]. It has also been
shown [10] that up to 97%, 42% and 11% of premises
associated with slaughterhouses, catching companies
and multi-site companies, respectively, are connected.
However, this result was reached on the assumption
that all premises using the same slaughterhouse, catch-
ing company or belonging to the same multi-site com-
pany are all potentially connected, with all links being
undirected. While most models assume that all poten-
tially infectious connections are always “active” (though
see also [1]), in practice there are other factors that will
limit the dissemination of disease across the commercial
poultry industry. First, over the time that a premises
might be expected to be able to transfer infection to
other premises, the number of actual connections will
depend on the frequency at which the contacts are
made. Furthermore, there are likely to be important dis-
tance constraints on how far people, vehicles and live-
stock will travel between premises. Therefore the range
over which infection is likely to travel via these means
will be limited (although there is currently no maximum
journey time for poultry [11]). Also, for catching compa-
nies and company personnel, it is possible that there are
regional divisions within the company, e.g. geographical
sub-divisions within multi-site companies and area-
based teams for catching companies, and this has not
previously been considered in models of HPAI transmis-
sion in GB. Therefore, obtaining detailed data on catch-
ing company and slaughterhouse movements for
simulation modelling of HPAI in GB has been high-
lighted as necessary for realistic modelling of HPAI
transmission [10]. The objective of this study was to col-
lect detailed movement data from a large catching com-
pany and to further explore the potential for HPAI to
spread via the routes highlighted.
Based on these new data, an individual farm-based
transmission model was developed where nodes are
poultry premises with links representing potential trans-
mission routes between premises. Although the static
approach (assuming all links between farms are poten-
tially active) that we have previously adopted [10] was
appropriate in the absence of detailed link data, the nat-
ure of these newly collated data enables us to use a
dynamic network model, as is standard practice in dis-
ease modelling [2,12], to determine if the frequency and
size (distance travelled) of movements between farms is
of such a nature as to reduce the concern for a large
HPAI epidemic in GB. In this updated model, the pre-
sence of links between premises is drawn from the col-
lected movement data. This model also incorporates
link directionality allowing for a more realistic and accu-
rate model. Here, the potential for an HPAI epidemic is
determined by considering the results of the individual-
based transmission model.
Methods
Data sources
Movement data from a major catching company were
obtained for all movements made over the 32 month
period between 02/01/2005 and 11/08/2007. These data
contain the times, dates and premises details for
approximately 55,500 movements associated with 68
catching teams (within the company) over 415 poultry
premises in GB. The premises associated with this
catching company are distributed across GB, as shown
in Figure 1. Given that if a premises is visited by a
catching team, then there must be a movement on the
same day between the premises and a slaughterhouse,
these movement data also include movements of birds
from premises to slaughter.
Population data on all commercial poultry premises
housing 50 or more birds, and within 15 km of farms
visited by teams belonging to the catching company,
were taken in November 2007 from an extract of the
GB Poultry Register (GBPR), provided by the Depart-
ment for environment, food and rural affairs (Defra).
The addition of these premises allowed us to consider
disease transmission that can occur between premises
that are in close spatial proximity, enabling us to con-
sider how likely infection is to jump from the network
of premises for which we have movement data to
another network of premises for which no movement
data were available for analysis. The addition of these
premises brought the number of premises studied up to
10,692. The total number of premises recorded in the
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number of premises serviced by the catching company
is small (approximately 2% of all premises in the GBPR),
by comparing the number of premises serviced by the
catching company with the number of premises known
to be associated with the largest catching companies in
England and Wales, we estimate that between 30% and
50% of premises serviced by a major contracted catching
company are accounted for in this dataset [13 and
unpublished data]. No data were available for small,
independent catching companies.
Premises in the catching company database were
matched to premises in the GBPR so that the model
could be parameterised using location, premises
population size and species data. Temporal aspects were
accounted for by preserving the order in which poultry
premises were visited by individual catching teams on a
daily basis. Additional information on which premises
belong to integrated companies was obtained from a
sample survey of integrated companies.
In the absence of quantitative movement data of com-
pany personnel for the farms studied, we sought expert
opinion [P. Mcmullin, Poultry Health Services, pers.
comm.] to inform the model of the likely frequency of
movements of personnel between farms, based on spe-
cies type, farm size and distance between farms belong-
ing to the same company. The probability of companies
using staff on multiple farms was estimated as well as
the estimated frequency of visits of veterinary officials
and area managers to poultry premises (Table 1).
Descriptive analysis
A descriptive analysis of the collected data is given in
Additional File 1. This analysis was used to identify any
trends in the data that could have important implica-
tions for disease transmission. In particular we consid-
ered how far catching teams and slaughterhouse
vehicles travelled between premises, as it was shown in
[10] that this had a large impact on the potential size of
an HPAI outbreak. The frequency of catching team
movements to premises, dependent on farm size, was
also considered in order to determine if premises size
should be recorded as an output of the simulation
model.
Simulation model (see also Additional File 2)
A stochastic simulation model at the farm level was
developed where farms were classed as susceptible,
infected, detected or culled. HPAI could be transmitted
between premises in close spatial proximity or through
contact via catching teams, slaughterhouse vehicles or
personnel movements within an integrated (multi-site)
company. A random number generator chooses a pre-
mises in the network to infect and a random date of
infection (within the 886 days covered by the catching
company data set). If the seed farm was not visited
within 15 days of this time point, assumed to be the
maximum time that HPAI would survive in the farm
environment, then transmission will be limited to local
spread, often resulting in little or no onward transmis-
sion from the seed premises. When transmission beyond
the seed premises did occur, outbreaks were allowed to
run their course.
We assumed a time step of one day in the model, so
that for each day of the simulation, once a premises had
become infected, we assumed silent spread up to the
time of detection. Detection and culling dates were set
within the model at time of infection and were
Figure 1 Distribution of catching company farms in GB. Map to
show the distribution of poultry premises associated with the
catching company studied. Each point represents a poultry farm.
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protection zone (PZ), a surveillance zone (SZ), or
neither, as described below.
On detection of notifiable HPAI in poultry, 10 km SZs
and 3 km PZs are typically set up around infected pre-
mises. In the model, we assumed no transmission within
the PZ/SZ via the normal movement of catching compa-
nies or slaughterhouse equipment since all movements
in those zones would be monitored. Therefore, spread
would only continue within the PZ/SZ via local spread.
Time to detection within an infected flock was assumed
to occur between 2 and 6 days (mean at 4 days) after
infection [14-18], with the mean reduced to 3 days for
flocks within a PZ or SZ. Culling occurs at the end of
an epidemic day. Using the time taken to cull birds in
the most recent outbreak of HPAI H5N1 in GB [19], we
assumed that culling was completed on infected farms
within 3 days of detection. One hundred simulations
were run for a range of parameter values (Table 1). Up
to 1,000 simulations were run for a subset of parameter
combinations with no qualitative change in the results.
For each simulation, the times at which each farm had
become infected and the times at which their state
changed from infected to detected and from detected to
culled was recorded.
Catching team and slaughterhouse movements
When a movement occurred between infected and sus-
ceptible farms, infection was spread between farms with
probability relating to the type of movement made.
W h e r em u l t i p l es p e c i e sw e r eh e l do no n ef a r m ,w e
assumed that catching teams catch, on average, one spe-
cies per visit with probability defined in Table 1. This
species became infected with probability of transmission
via catching team. If a susceptible farm had multiple
links from an infected premises, then each link was trea-
ted independently, and the probability of infection there-
fore increased. We assumed that catching team and
slaughterhouse vehicles do not remain infectious over-
night, as we assume that effective decontamination pro-
cedures were in place. A premises was designated as
infected if one or more species on the premises was
infected.
Company (personnel) movements
We assume that spread of infection between farms
belonging to the same multi-site, integrated company
could occur either via the movements of area managers
or veterinary officials between premises, or via staff
working on multiple farms. Movements of veterinary
officials, of area managers and of company personnel
were simulated on a per day basis by using farm size
and distance between farms belonging to the same
multi-site company to identify using parameters in
Table 1 if a) two premises are to be visited on the same
day by the same person and, b) if the link made between
premises will result in transmission of disease. The
model assumes independence between days so that the
last time a premises was visited is not accounted for.
Local (spatial) spread (see Additional Files 2 and 3)
Based on expert opinion, we assume spatial (primarily
airborne) spread in GB is likely to occur with small prob-
ability (p ≤ 0.01) and only for distances up to a maximum
0.5 km [D. Alexander, R. Irvine pers. comm.], according
to the density kernel that is given in Equation 1.
For dist < 0.5 km:
p(trans|dist)=0 . 0 1

1 − dist
0.5
 22
(1)
Table 1 Model parameters
Parameter Value Source
Incubation period Up to 1 day (shedding after 8 hours, death
after one day)
I. Brown (pers. comm); [14,15]
Survival of virus on seed premises Up to15 days [16]
Probability of staff working on multiple premises
(Farm size)
0.45 (< 50,000 birds)
0.1 (50,000 to 200,000 birds)
0 (> 200,000 birds)
P. McMullin (pers. comm)
Distance travelled by staff between premises Up to 35 km P McMullin (pers. comm.)
Frequency of vet visits Every 50 days P. McMullin (pers. comm)
Frequency of manager visits Every 10 days (non-layer farms)
Every 50 days (layer farms)
P. McMullin (pers. comm)
Probability catching team catches species (multi
species farms only)
0.7 Chicken
0.12 Turkey
0.16 Duck/goose
0.01 Other
Calculated from catching company data, where
species type available
Probability of catching team, slaughterhouse
and owner transmission
0 to 0.2, in steps of 0.01, with additional
parameter at 0.001 added.
N/A
Time to detection 2 to 6 days (15 days later for ducks/geese) Extrapolation from [15-17]
Parameter values for the network simulation model of avian influenza transmission in Great Britain
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A sensitivity analysis of the model to the assumption
that airborne spread could occur is given in Additional
File 3.
Analysis of simulation output
We first consider the proportion of outbreaks that
resulted in onward spread beyond the seed case. Here,
the results follow a linear trend and, as the outcome is a
binary variable (essentially secondary spread, or no sec-
ondary spread) dependent on explanatory variables that
can be categorised into multiple levels, the analysis
lends itself to a logistic regression. Thus a binary logistic
regression was done (using Minitab v16) on the propor-
tion of outbreaks that resulted in onward spread beyond
the seed case. We next consider final epidemic size. In
order to determine how the different types of transmis-
sion affect the epidemic size, two logistic regression
models were fitted (Minitab v16). In the first, the binary
response variable describes whether a small (< 25 pre-
mises) epidemic occurs or not. In the second, the binary
response variable describes whether a large (> 65 pre-
mises) epidemic occurs or not. In both cases, the expla-
natory variables are the simulated transmission
probabilities for AIV transmission via catching company,
slaughterhouse- and owner-related movements.
Results
Additional File 1 gives a data summary and descriptive
analysis of the catching company data. The key points
of this analysis are given below:
1. When the frequency of movements is not
accounted for, slaughterhouse related movements
connected 94% of premises, catching team move-
ments connected 76% of premises and owner move-
ments 11% of premises that are associated with the
catching company. However, when time is consid-
ered, catching teams connect only 2 premises per
day and slaughterhouses an average of 3 premises
per day.
2. Contrary to expectations, the data presented show
that premises do use multiple slaughterhouses and
are associated with multiple catching teams within
t h es a m ec o m p a n y( c o n s e c u t i v e l yo v e rt h et i m ep e r -
iod studied). There is no overlap between poultry
companies (i.e. poultry premises are associated with
only one poultry company).
3. There is an increase in frequency of visits to lar-
ger premises, implying that these premises will be at
a higher risk of infection should infection be trans-
mitted by catching team or slaughterhouse vehicles/
equipment.
4. Slaughterhouse vehicles and catching teams travel
long distances between premises, with 72% of move-
ments between premises exceeding 10 km in length.
Simulation modelling
One hundred simulations were run for a total of 10,648
scenarios. Each scenario represents a different combina-
tion of transmission values for each of the transmission
routes studied. In particular, each scenario was created
by ranging parameters from 0 to 0.2, in a step-wise fash-
ion, such that each parameter took on one of 22 possi-
ble values within this range, giving rise to 22
3 =1 0 , 6 4 8
scenarios.
Proportion of positive epidemics spread beyond the
index case
The aims of the simulation model are to determine if a
large outbreak of AIV is possible in the poultry industry
in GB and, if so, what might cause a large outbreak to
occur. One way of answering the first question is to
consider how often infection spreads beyond the seed
premises. That is to ask “how many simulated outbreaks
result in secondary spread?”
When all scenarios and all simulation results are con-
sidered together, infection spread beyond the seed pre-
mises in approximately 15% of the simulations run
(mean value over all simulations and all scenarios). Fig-
ure 2 shows how the distribution of infections that
result in secondary spread varies as the probability of
AIV transmission is increased. For this, the probability
of transmission was calculated by combining the prob-
ability of transmission via catching team, slaughterhouse
and company personnel, as shown in Equation 2.
P(iI n f e c t e d )=1− (
3 
j−1
(1 − pj)) (2)
for pj probability of infection for via link type j.
Infection resulted in secondary spread (beyond the
seed premises) in up to 35% of scenarios. The simula-
tion that gave the maximum number of cases that
spread beyond the seed premises was from the following
scenario: catching team (cc) = 0.04, company personnel
(owner) = 0.19 and slaughterhouse (sh) = 0.13. This sug-
gests that high probabilities of transmission are not
necessary in all three potential transmission routes for
infection to (relatively) frequently spread beyond the
index case.
Results from a logistic regression analysis are shown
in Tables 2, 3 and 4. Consider the odds ratios in Tables
2, 3 and 4. The results show that transmission via the
movement of catching teams does not have a significant
effect on the probability that an outbreak will result in
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pany personal appear to be significant at all levels, with
the exception of transmission set to p = 0.001.M o v e -
ments related to slaughterhouse vehicles are significant
in the probability that an outbreak will result in onward
spread only when the probability of transmission is high
enough (here, the model predicts a rate of > 0.06 for a
significant effect to be seen). Further, the odds ratios
also tell us that, under the assumptions made, as the
rate of transmission increases for owner movements in
particular, the effect on the probability of secondary
spread is increasingly large, with the odds ratio rising to
2.11 (2.03, 2.19 (95% CIs)) for a transmission rate of
0.14 compared to zero. This suggests that the probabil-
ity of secondary spread beyond the seed premises is not
uniformly affected by transmission rates across the dif-
ferent link types. This is driven by the characteristics of
the networks over which disease can spread.
Figure 2 The proportion of outbreaks that spread beyond the seed premises for all simulation results. Boxplots to show the median,
quartiles and outer points of the proportion of outbreaks (over 100 simulations) that spread beyond the seed premises, for increasing rates of
transmission. Here, transmission is recorded as the combined risk of AIV transmission over all routes, according to Equation 2.
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different transmission routes can have on the results,
each potential transmission route was considered on
its own as well as in combination with one or more
other potential routes of transmission. Figure 3 shows
boxplots that describe the proportion of outbreaks that
result in onward spread for different scenarios. The
figure shows that a higher proportion of outbreaks
occur for transmission via owner-related (gp2) move-
ments than for catching company (gp1) or slaughter-
house-related (gp3) movements. It appears that adding
catching company transmission to either transmission
via slaughterhouse- or owner-related movements (gp5
and gp6, respectively) has little impact on the propor-
tion of outbreaks that would result in secondary spread
if the main effects were considered alone. However, the
combination of slaughterhouse- and owner-related
movements (gp4) suggests that this combination can
result in a large proportion of outbreaks resulting in
secondary spread. Finally, it is interesting to note that
Figure 3 also shows that when all three transmission
routes (cc, sh and owner) are greater than zero, a large
proportion of outbreaks can result in onward spread
(gp7).
The statistical significance of interaction terms can be
determined by refitting the logistic regression model,
with interaction terms included. As the model did not
converge when all tested transmission rates were consid-
ered as a single level, in order to consider the potential
interaction between different networks the data were
categorised into “high”, “medium” and “low” probabil-
ities of transmission and the model refitted (see Addi-
tional File 4 Table S1). Although the results (Additional
File 4 Table S1) show that only medium and high levels
of owner transmission have a significant effect on the
results, for all levels of owner/slaughterhouse interac-
tion, there was a significant difference between the
results from this interaction, compared to zero. This
implies that whilst slaughterhouse transmission alone is
not enough for an outbreak to result in secondary
spread, the combination of owner and slaughterhouse
related movements has a significant effect on the prob-
ability that an outbreak results in secondary spread,
even for low levels of transmission of disease. The
results from Additional File 4 Table S1 also show that
there is no significant interaction effect from the catch-
ing company - owner interaction or from the catching
company - slaughterhouse interaction (the confidence
Table 2 Binary logistic regression, with odds ratios
calculated for the probability of secondary spread versus
catching company transmission rates
Transmission
rate
Odds
Ratio
Lower
95% CI
Upper
95% CI
p-value
0.001 0.97 0.93 1 0.064
0.01 1 0.97 1.04 0.813
0.02 0.95 0.92 0.98 0.005
0.03 0.97 0.94 1.01 0.14
0.04 1.02 0.98 1.06 0.303
0.05 0.96 0.93 0.99 0.024
0.06 0.96 0.93 1 0.043
0.07 0.99 0.95 1.02 0.451
0.08 0.96 0.93 1 0.038
0.09 0.95 0.92 0.99 0.011
0.1 0.97 0.94 1.01 0.124
0.11 0.98 0.94 1.01 0.23
0.12 0.99 0.96 1.03 0.677
0.13 1 0.97 1.04 0.906
0.14 0.98 0.94 1.01 0.187
0.15 0.98 0.95 1.02 0.267
0.16 0.96 0.92 0.99 0.018
0.17 1 0.96 1.03 0.871
0.18 0.98 0.95 1.02 0.313
0.19 0.96 0.93 1 0.047
0.2 0.98 0.95 1.02 0.359
Table 3 Binary logistic regression, with odds ratios
calculated for the probability of secondary spread versus
owner transmission rates
Transmission rate Odds Ratio Lower
95% CI
Upper
95% CI
p-value
0.001 0.98 0.94 1.03 0.488
0.01 1.09 1.04 1.14 0
0.02 1.19 1.14 1.24 0
0.03 1.27 1.22 1.33 0
0.04 1.38 1.33 1.44 0
0.05 1.42 1.37 1.48 0
0.06 1.47 1.41 1.53 0
0.07 1.53 1.47 1.59 0
0.08 1.66 1.59 1.72 0
0.09 1.74 1.67 1.81 0
0.1 1.75 1.69 1.83 0
0.11 1.86 1.79 1.94 0
0.12 1.97 1.89 2.04 0
0.13 1.94 1.87 2.02 0
0.14 2.11 2.03 2.19 0
0.15 2.09 2.01 2.17 0
0.16 2.19 2.11 2.27 0
0.17 2.24 2.16 2.33 0
0.18 2.33 2.24 2.42 0
0.19 2.38 2.29 2.47 0
0.2 2.38 2.29 2.47 0
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that, in theory, catching company transmission can be
dropped from the model. With catching company
removed from the results and the regression rerun, the
final logistic regression results are given in Table 5.
Epidemic size
In this part of the analysis, only epidemics that result in
spread beyond the seed premises are considered. This
accounts for approximately 15% of all simulation results.
For all results, there were no epidemics of size
between 23 and 66 premises (see Figure 4). The number
of large epidemics, which we consider here to involve
more than 65 infected premises (those epidemics in Fig-
ure 4b), is small, representing 0.2% of all results. How-
ever, these are the epidemics that are likely to cause the
most strain on resources in an outbreak situation, so it
is important to determine from the data if the rate of
transmission via different routes, or the index premises
in these epidemics, have any notable characteristics.
There were a total of 330 individual premises that
were included in the set of outbreaks that resulted in
onward spread (~80% of population for which move-
ment data were available). Of these, 95 individual
premises were seed premises in the (249) “large” epi-
demics recorded. All 95 of these premises were also
seed premises in the list of (130939) “small” epidemics.
Premises size (number of birds) was available for 78% of
seed premises for large epidemics, and for 94% of seed
premises for small epidemics. The results (Table 6) sug-
gest that a large epidemic is more likely to occur when
infection is seeded in large premises (37 of 74 “large”
epidemics began in large premises). However, infection
into large premises does not imply a large epidemic will
occur. Interestingly, the mean epidemic size when infec-
tion is seeded in small premises (3.8) is larger than that
of both medium (2.8) and large premises (3.1). This may
be connected to the probability of an outbreak resulting
in spread beyond the seed premises, as owner links have
been shown to be important and owner movements are
more likely to occur in small premises (an immediate
effect of the model assumptions).
In order to determine how the different types of trans-
mission affect the epidemic size, two logistic regression
models were fitted. In the first, the binary response vari-
able describes whether a small (< 25 premises) epidemic
occurs or not. In the second, the binary response vari-
able describes whether a large (> 65 premises) epidemic
occurs or not. In both cases, the explanatory variables
are the simulated transmission probabilities for AIV
transmission via catching company, slaughterhouse- and
owner-related movements. The results are shown in
Additional File 4 Table S2 to S7.
For small epidemics, Additional File 4 Tables S2 to S4
show that catching company movements have a signifi-
cant influence on the results for a range of probability
values between 0.02 and 0.16. Interestingly, when these
results are significant (the odds ratio confidence inter-
vals do not contain zero), the odds ratios show that the
probability of a small epidemic decreases (the odds
ratios are less than 1) with an increase in catching com-
pany transmission rates, when compared to zero. This
suggests that an increase in catching company transmis-
sion might result in a higher proportion of epidemics
being larger. Additional File 4 Table S3 shows that
transmission via owner movements is significant at all
levels above p = 0.001. Above this value, the odds ratios
are all larger than one, implying that increasing the rate
of transmission results in the likelihood of a small epi-
demic occurring to increase. For slaughterhouses (Addi-
tional File 4 Table S4), significant results are obtained
for transmission rates > 0.05. The strength of the signifi-
cance does not increase in proportion with the increase
in transmission, with all transmission rates > 0.12 having
an odds ratio value of between 1.07 and 1.10. These
results therefore suggest that the most influential para-
meter for the probability of a small epidemic to occur is
transmission via owner movements.
Table 4 Binary logistic regression, with odds ratios
calculated for the probability of secondary spread versus
slaughterhouse transmission rates
Transmission
rate
Odds
Ratio
Lower
95% CI
Upper
95% CI
p-value
0.001 0.97 0.93 1.01 0.093
0.01 0.99 0.95 1.02 0.435
0.02 0.99 0.95 1.03 0.597
0.03 1 0.96 1.03 0.861
0.04 1 0.96 1.03 0.824
0.05 1 0.96 1.04 0.927
0.06 1.04 1 1.08 0.036
0.07 1.03 1 1.07 0.068
0.08 1.04 1.01 1.08 0.019
0.09 1.04 1.01 1.08 0.019
0.1 1.05 1.01 1.09 0.012
0.11 1.07 1.03 1.11 0
0.12 1.05 1.01 1.09 0.008
0.13 1.09 1.05 1.13 0
0.14 1.08 1.04 1.12 0
0.15 1.09 1.06 1.13 0
0.16 1.08 1.04 1.12 0
0.17 1.08 1.04 1.12 0
0.18 1.09 1.06 1.13 0
0.19 1.1 1.06 1.14 0
0.2 1.1 1.06 1.14 0
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Page 8 of 14Additional File 4 Table S5 and S6 show that, contrary
to expectations, neither catching company nor owner
movements play a significant role in the probability that
an outbreak will result in a large epidemic. For large
epidemics, the most influential predictor is the transmis-
sion rate via slaughterhouse linked movemernts (Addi-
tional File 4 Table S7). Analysis of the odds ratios for
slaughterhouse transmission versus large epidemics
shows that this transmission route is only influential if it
is high enough (above 0.12). However, when it is high
enough, the upper 95% limits (for the odds ratios) show
that an increase from zero transmission to a higher
transmission rate will result in a large epidemic being
up to 28 times more likely. This is a very striking result
with heavy implications on resources, for example, in
the event of an outbreak. It is therefore essential to
Figure 3 The proportion of outbreaks that spread beyond the seed premises for different parameter combinations. Boxplots of the
proportion of outbreaks that result in spread beyond the seed premises, for different parameter combinations. gp1 = sh, gp2 = owner, gp3 = cc,
gp4 = owner and sh, gp5 = cc and sh, gp6 = cc and owner, gp7 = cc, owner and sh. Within each group, parameters are varied from 0 to 0.2.
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Page 9 of 14determine the true probability of transmission via this
route.
Spatial spread
While the majority of outbreaks did not result in further
onward transmission from the index premises, outbreaks
could potentially cover up to 20% of the population (for
a range of parameter values < 0.2) for which network
data were available, covering distances of up to 730 km
between premises (see Additional File 5, Figure S1).
Although for the largest distances to be covered (> 700
km), at least one transmission parameter must be as
high as 0.12, occasionally, distances over 600 km
between premises are reached for transmission para-
meters between zero and 0.07. This has important
implications for the availability of control resources as
the number of premises in the SZs will be greater if dis-
semination of virus is geographically widespread and
therefore potentially involving a larger number of local
disease control centres. Large epidemics invariably
resulted in widespread geographical dissemination of
virus.
In this model, infection can only be spread into pre-
mises that are not serviced by the catching company, by
spatial transmission of disease, to premises within 500
m of infected premises. This results in infection of
premises that are potentially connected to different sub-
networks (via other catching companies, slaughterhouses
or poultry companies for example) in less than 1% of
the simulations run. However, we have seen that trans-
mission via sh-linked movements is an important factor
in determining final epidemic size, and slaughterhouses
that are included in the network studied may also be
used by poultry premises not included here. This
implies that if this route is important, infection may
leak into other sub-networks of the industry much more
frequently.
Discussion
Despite the extent of data previously available on the
British poultry industry, the detailed contact structures
within the poultry industry in GB have only been poorly
understood. Previous studies have been able to identify
potential contact structures but assumptions have had
to be made on the frequency and patterns of move-
ments between farms [10,15,20]. Whilst it is important
to acknowledge that the models presented here rely
heavily on expert opinion (which is arguably a drawback
of such a modelling approach), in the absence of out-
break data for AIV in GB, this cannot be avoided. For
this reason, we have considered many scenarios by vary-
ing parameter values and by combining expert opinion
Table 5 Binary Logistic regression: secondary spread versus transmission rates for interaction between transmission
routes at different levels of transmission
Predictor Coefficient SE Odds Ratio Lower 95% CI Upper 95% CI p-value
Constant -2.16587 0.071836 0
owncat
1 0.004215 0.076562 1 0.86 1.17 0.956
2 0.415397 0.075335 1.51 1.31 1.76 0
3 0.631829 0.074869 1.88 1.62 2.18 0
shcat
1 -0.22299 0.077486 0.8 0.69 0.93 0.004
2 -0.12265 0.077053 0.88 0.76 1.03 0.111
3 -0.0784 0.076875 0.92 0.8 1.07 0.308
owncat*shcat
1*1 0.248773 0.082484 1.28 1.09 1.51 0.003
1*2 0.227419 0.082041 1.26 1.07 1.47 0.006
1*3 0.229411 0.081855 1.26 1.07 1.48 0.005
2*1 0.207304 0.0812 1.23 1.05 1.44 0.011
2*2 0.154659 0.080772 1.17 1 1.37 0.056
2*3 0.140458 0.080593 1.15 0.98 1.35 0.081
3*1 0.228509 0.0807 1.26 1.07 1.47 0.005
3*2 0.174293 0.080272 1.19 1.02 1.39 0.03
3*3 0.15525 0.080095 1.17 1 1.37 0.053
Final model.
Level 1 = low transmission rate 0 - 0.06, level 2 = medium transmission rate 0.07 - 0.13, level 3 = high transmission rate 0.14 - 0.2. sh = slaughterhouse, own =
company personnel. SE = standard error.
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Page 10 of 14Figure 4 Epidemic size. Histogram of epidemic size for infections resulting in onward spread beyond the seed premises. a) epidemics including
fewer than 25 infected premises and b) epidemics including more than 65 infected premises.
Table 6 Effect of seed premises on outbreak size
Seed premises size Number unique premises in small
epidemics (seed)
Number unique premises in large
epidemics (seed)
Proportion outbreaks resulting in
large epidemics
Small (≤ 100,000 birds) 35 20 0.57
Medium (100,000 -
200,000 birds)
59 17 0.29
Large (> 200,000 birds) 141 37 0.26
The proportion of outbreaks that result in large/small epidemics for different size categories of seed premises.
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Page 11 of 14with real time movement data from a large catching
company, we have been able to adopt a similar approach
to that used in [1] to investigate the potential spread of
AIV in the GB poultry industry.
The results presented here show that restrictions on
the frequency of movements can have an important role
in determining disease spread risk. In particular, connec-
tions via slaughterhouses can connect a large number of
premises over a large geographical area, important in
the potential for virus dissemination. Spread via slaugh-
terhouse-linked movements is most prominent when
partial flock depopulation is being undertaken at a farm,
as this action results in more premises being visited in
one day and potential infection of birds that remain on
the farm. This is also an important output for the con-
trol of diseases other than HPAI, such as Salmonella or
Campylobacter spp., where the slaughterhouse is a more
likely reservoir for pathogens [21]. We note here that,
whilst slaughterhouses and catching teams are separated
in this study, in some cases one might group the two
transmission routes together under the assumption that
any movement that arises due to a catching team visit-
ing a farm is considered a ‘catching company’ move-
ment. The results are likely to be sensitive to such an
assumption and thus it is important not to misinterpret
them. However, the principles used in this study remain
valid for the potential transmission of diseases spread by
the faeco-oral route, such as Campylobacter spp. and
Salmonella,a sw e l la sd i f f e r e n ts t r a i n so fH P A I .T h e
model is well-suited to investigating diseases where
expert opinion does not have to be so heavily relied
upon for model parameterisation (as expert opinion
adds uncertainty to results, resulting in one only being
able to answer ‘what-if’ scenarios, in a situation the
model assumptions may affect interpretation of results).
In Campylobacter research, for example, one would
expect the model results to be quite different due to dif-
ference in epidemiological characteristics of Campylo-
bacter spp. compared to HPAI. With a perceived higher
prevalence of the pathogen, we would expect the results
of the model presented here, applied to Campylobacter
spp. to show that catching company movements are
likely to have a bigger effect on the spread of disease
between farms.
Despite the relatively heavy use of expert opinion to
estimate model parameters in this study - in particular
for the frequency of movements made by company per-
sonnel, we can use the model presented here to
hypothesise about the importance of different types of
potentially infectious links between poultry premises
and we can conclude from these results that, where
slaughterhouses can act as a reservoir for pathogens, the
spread via this route should be minimized. This can be
achieved through additional bio-security measures, such
as thorough cleaning of the crates and vehicles that
carry the birds, for example.
The results that catching team movements have little
effect both on the probability of an outbreak resulting in
onward spread beyond the seed premises and on the
probability of a large epidemic occurring are important
results, as they suggest that the number of farms that a
catching team visits during the infectious period of the
virus is too low to link a high number of farms, in GB,
during an epidemic. For pathogens that can survive for
longer periods in the environment or that are more pre-
valent than HPAI (such as Campylobacter spp.), the
number of farms that can be linked by catching team
movements will be (potentially significantly) higher.
However, while extensive and therefore of value, the
data used here correspond to only one (large) catching
company that is made up of a 68 distinct catching
teams. As each farm may be visited by one or more of
the catching teams, there are no distinct regional divi-
sions apparent within this company as was initially
expected. Further, these data do not consider further
spread once other networks (e.g. connected by slaugh-
terhouses and catching companies) contain infected
premises.
Although all three transmission routes were positive
when a large proportion of (simulated) outbreaks
resulted in spread beyond the seed premises, the fitting
of a regression models suggests that only company per-
sonnel movements significantly influence the probability
that infection will spread beyond the seed premises.
This highlights the importance of obtaining more accu-
rate estimates on the frequency of movements of com-
pany personnel and the probability of transmission via
this route.
There was a significant interaction effect for the own-
er*slaughterhouse interaction on the proportion of out-
breaks that result in onward spread. However, the
combinations of potential transmission of disease via
catching company and company personnel movements,
or slaughterhouse-linked and catching company move-
ments have little effect on the proportion of outbreaks
that result in onward spread, particularly compared to
the individual owner effect. This can be explained by
the frequency of movements relative to premises size
(Additional File 1 Figures S6 to S9), such that the
increased frequency of catching company movements in
particular (and also, but less so for slaughterhouse-
linked movements), to larger premises is not high
enough to force these potential transmission routes to
have a large effect on the proportion of outbreaks that
result in spread beyond the seed premises, compared to
transmission via owner movements. Having highlighted
owner movements as important in previous studies [10]
and given that they can have a large effect on the
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Page 12 of 14number of outbreaks resulting in an epidemic, it is
recommended that data collection is expanded to
include movement data from an integrated company,
furthering our ability to provide more robust estimates
of epidemic size and likelihood.
The results show that there is a “jump” from epi-
demics of size lower than 23 infected farms (< 5% of
premises), to epidemics containing more that 65
infected farms (~20% of premises). This is in line with
results published by [22], who report that a predictor of
the need to intensify control efforts in GB is whether an
outbreak exceeds 20 infected premises. The results fol-
low the pattern of epidemic outbreak sizes (at least qua-
litatively) as expected for any stochastic epidemic model,
with epidemics either going extinct early, or growing to
reach a substantial proportion of the population. Whilst
this result, which represents a threshold for the basic
reproduction number, R0 , will be affected by the struc-
ture of the networks, investigating network structure
alone is not enough to fully investigate the effect of R0 .
To do this, one would need to understand the effect of
the individual transmission rates on the probability of a
large outbreak.
When comparing the results for small epidemics
against those for large epidemics, two factors that differ
significantly between the two categories are worth not-
ing: the effect of the probability of transmission via
slaughterhouse movements and seed premises size.
Large epidemics are up to 28 times more likely for
higher levels of slaughterhouse transmission (compared
to zero), implying that the characteristics of the network
of slaughterhouse links are maintained even when a
time component and control measures are added, result-
ing in connectivity between a higher proportion of pre-
mises via this route than via any other route. This result
confirms that slaughterhouses are an important factor in
this model. The size of seed premises plays a role here
as there is an increase in frequency of catching team
and slaughterhouse visits to larger premises (Additional
File 1 Figure S10). This results in large outbreaks being
more likely to occur, as a result of infection in a large
seed premises. It is reiterated however that this does not
imply that infection seeded in large premises will always
result in a large outbreak. Nevertheless, this result does
suggests that if premises are to be prioritised during
contact tracing, there will be some benefit to targeting
large premises ahead of smaller ones in a epidemic
situation. Further investigation into all premises
included in these epidemics to identify whether the
same premises are included in the large epidemics is
highlighted here as an area for further research. This
will also identify premises that might be considered par-
ticularly high risk.
We note that all slaughterhouses that appear in the
movement data analysed are recorded as slaughtering
birds from farms that are not visited by the catching
company studied. This implies that the network of pre-
mises studied is not closed; with up to 131 additional
farms sending birds to the same slaughterhouse (unpub-
lished data), the possibility of disease spreading into
other sub-networks within the industry is potentially
high. It is therefore very important to ensure the data
held on slaughterhouses and their customers is both
complete and up to date. This will enable better prioriti-
sation of the potentially large number of premises that
could undergo surveillance in an outbreak situation.
Our results show that the distribution of poultry pre-
mises in GB is not dense enough for airborne transmis-
sion of AIV contribute significantly to between premises
spread amongst premises recorded in the GBPR, so long
as the distance for airborne transmission is less than
500 m. This has not been the case in past outbreaks in
other countries, such as the Netherlands and Italy,
where local spread is likely to have played a role in the
transmission of disease from one farm to another.
Should a virus strain that can easily transmit via air-
borne transmission be modelled, then local spread may
result in spread between premises that have no other
direct connections. For other virus strains, this could
h a v eal a r g ei m p a c to nt h ep roportion of outbreaks
resulting in spread beyond the seed premises and the
maximum epidemic size. This implies that there is pos-
sible scope to reduce the size of the 10 km SZs, freeing
resources for use elsewhere. This could be explored
further by using network data currently available to
explore how large a SZ should be, taking into account
resource constraints and simulating over a range of
assumptions regarding transmission rates. The mean
number of premises affected by an epidemic may be
dependent not only on the underlying epidemiological
parameters, but also on the total resources available.
Resource constraints were not included in this model
but the model could be adapted to aid future work in
this area, important for exploring optimal resource allo-
cation in order to provide the most efficient detection of
AIV and the curtailing of the outbreak.
Conclusions
Previous work has shown that large proportions of the
poultry industry are potentially connected by catching
companies and by slaughterhouse [10]. However, such
analyses did not take into account the restriction in the
number of interaction events that could occur over the
course of a typical infectious period. Including these
effects, such as via the explicit spatio-temporal simula-
tions explored in this study, shows that such restrictions
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Page 13 of 14can have an important role in determining disease
spread risk.
In line with previous work [10], we have shown that
slaughterhouses connect the highest number of premises
in the poultry industry. Furthermore, the potentially
high frequency of company personnel between farms
renders this type of movement more important in the
beginning of an outbreak. Contrary to expectations,
however, the frequency of movements of catching teams
between premises is not high enough to connect large
numbers of premises, reducing the potential for a large
outbreak spread via this route, in GB. The size of seed
premises played a role in final epidemic size suggesting
that there will be some benefit to targeting large pre-
mises ahead of smaller ones in an epidemic situation.
The ability of the virus to jump from one sector of the
industry to another highlights the importance of keeping
data on movements on and off poultry farms both
detailed and up to date.
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